Saturday, August 23, 2008

Update: The Cloud Computing Bill of Rights

Thanks to all that provided input on the first revision of the Cloud Computing Bill of Rights. The feedback has been incredible, including several eye opening references, and some basic concepts that were missed the first time through. An updated "CCBOR" is below, but I first want to directly outline the changes, and credit those that provided input.

  1. Abhishek Kumar points out that government interference in data privacy and security rights needs to be explicitly acknowledged. I hear him loud and clear, though I think the customer can expect only that laws will remain within the constitutional (or doctrinal) bounds of their particular government, and that government retains the right to create law as it deems necessary within those parameters.

    What must also be acknowledged, however, is that customers have the right to know exactly what laws are in force for the cloud systems they choose to use. Does this mean that vendors should hire civil rights lawyers, or that the customer is on their own to figure that out? I honestly don't know.

  2. Peter Laird's "The Good, Bad, and the Ugly of SaaS Terms of Service, Licenses, and Contracts" is a must read when it comes to data rights. It finds for enterprises what was observed by NPR the other night for individuals; that you have very few data privacy rights right now, that your provider probably has explicit provisions protecting them and exposing you or your organization, and the cloud exposes risks that enterprises avoid by owning their own clouds.

    This reinforces the notion that we must understand that privacy is not guaranteed in the cloud, no matter what your provider says. As Laird puts it:

    "...[A] customer should have an explicit and absolute right to data ownership regardless of how a contract is terminated."
  3. Ian Osbourne asks "should there be a right to know where the data will be stored, and potentially a service level requirement to limit host countries?" I say absolutely! It will be impossible for customers to obey laws globally unless data is maintained in known jurisdictions. This was the catalyst for the "Follow the Law Computing" post. Good catch!

  4. John Marsh of GeekPAC links to his own emerging attempt at a Bill of Rights. In it, he points out a critical concept that I missed:

    "[Vendors] may not terminate [customer] account[s] for political statements, inappropriate language, statements of sexual nature, religious commentary, or statements critical of [the vendor's] service, with exceptions for specific laws, eg. hate speech, where they apply."

    Bravo, and noted.

  5. Unfortunately, the federal courts have handed down a series of rulings that challenge the ability of global citizens and businesses to do business securely and privately in the cloud. This Bill of Rights is already under grave attack.

Below is the complete text of the second revision of the Cloud Computing Bill of Rights. Let's call the first "CCBOR 0.1" and this one "CCBOR 0.2". I'll update the original post to reflect the versioning.

One last note. My intention in presenting this post was not to become the authority on cloud computing consumer rights. It is, rather, the cornerstone of my Cloud Computing Architecture discussion, in which I need to move on to the next point. I'm working on setting up a WIKI for this "document". Is there anyone out there in particular that would like to host it?

The Cloud Computing Bill of Rights (0.2)

In the course of technical history, there exist few critical innovations that forever change the way technical economies operate; forever changing the expectations that customers and vendors have of each other, and the architectures on which both rely for commerce. We, the parties entering into a new era driven by one such innovation--that of network based services, platforms and applications, known at the writing of this document as "cloud computing"--do hereby avow the following (mostly) inalienable rights:

  • Article I: Customers Own Their Data

    1. No vendor shall, in the course of its relationship with any customer, claim ownership of any data uploaded, created, generated, modified, hosted or in any other way associated with the customer's intellectual property, engineering effort or media creativity. This also includes account configuration data, customer generated tags and categories, usage and traffic metrics, and any other form of analytics or meta data collection.

      Customer data is understood to include all data directly maintained by the customer, as well as that of the customer's own customers. It is also understood to include all source code and data related to configuring and operating software directly developed by the customer, except for data expressly owned by the underlying infrastructure or platform provided by the vendor.

    2. Vendors shall always provide, at a minimum, API level access to all customer data as described above. This API level access will allow the customer to write software which, when executed against the API, allows access to any customer maintained data, either in bulk or record-by-record as needed. As standards and protocols are defined that allow for bulk or real-time movement of data between cloud vendors, each vendor will endeavor to implement such technologies, and will not attempt to stall such implementation in an attempt to lock in its customers.

    3. Customers own their data, which in turn means they own responsibility for the data's security and adherence to privacy laws and agreements. As with monitoring and data access APIs, vendors will endeavor to provide customers with the tools and services they need to meet their own customers' expectations. However, customers are responsible for determining a vendor's relevancy to specific requirements, and to provide backstops, auditing and even indemnification as required by agreements with their own customers.

      Ultimately, however, governments are responsible for the regulatory environments that define the limits of security and privacy laws. As governments can choose any legal requirement that works within the constraints of their own constitutions or doctrines, customers must be aware of what may or may not happen to their data in the jurisdictions in which data resides, is processed or is referenced. As constitutions vary from country to country, it may not even be required for governments to inform customers what specific actions are taken with or against their data. That laws exist that could put their data in jeopardy, however, is the minimum that governments convey to the market.

      Customers (and their customers) must leverage the legislative mechanisms of any jurisdiction of concern to change those parameters.

      In order for enough trust to be built into the online cloud economy, however, governments should endeavor to build a legal framework that respects corporate and individual privacy, and overall data security. While national security is important, governments must be careful not to create an atmosphere in which the customers and vendors of the cloud distrust their ability to securely conduct business within the jurisdiction, either directly or indirectly.

    4. Because regulatory effects weigh so heavily on data usage, security and privacy, vendors shall, at a minimum, inform customers specifically where their data is housed. A better option would be to provide mechanisms by which users can choose where their data will be stored. Either way, vendors should also endeavor to work with customers to assure that their systems designs do not conflict with known legal or regulatory obstacles. This is assumed to apply to primary, backup and archived data instances.
  • Article II: Vendors and Customers Jointly Own System Service Levels

    1. Vendors own, and shall do everything in their power to meet, service level targets committed to with any given customer. All required effort and expense necessary to meet those explicit service levels will be spent freely and without additional expense to the customer. While the specific legally binding contracts or business agreements will spell out these requirements, it is noted here that these service level agreements are entered into expressly to protect both the customer's and vendor's business interests, and all decisions by the vendor will take both parties equally into account.

      Where no explicit service level agreement exists with a customer, the vendor will endeavor to meet any expressed service level targets provided in marketing literature or the like. At no time will it be acceptable for a vendor to declare a high level of service at a base price, only to later indicate that that level of service is only available at a higher premium price.

      It is perfectly acceptable, however, for a vendor to expressly sell a higher level of service at a higher price, as long as they make that clear at all points where a customer may evaluate or purchase the service.

    2. Ultimately, though, customers own their service level commitments to their own internal or external customers, and the customer understands that it is their responsibility to take into account possible failures by each vendor that they do business with.

      Customers relying on a single vendor to meet their own service level commitments enter into an implicit agreement to tie their own service level commitments to the vendor's, and to live and die by the vendor's own infrastructure reliability. Those customers who take their own commitments seriously will seek to build or obtain independent monitoring, failure recovery and disaster recovery systems.

    3. Where customer/vendor system integration is necessary, the vendor's must offer options for monitoring the viability of that integration at as many architectural levels as required to allow the customer to meet their own service level commitments. Where standards exist for such monitoring, the vendor will implement those standards in a timely and complete fashion. The vendor should not underestimate the importance of this monitoring to the customer's own business commitments.

    4. Under no circumstances will vendors terminate customer accounts for political statements, inappropriate language, statements of sexual nature, religious commentary, or statements critical of the vendor's service, with exceptions for specific laws, e.g. hate speech, where they apply.
  • Article III: Vendors Own Their Interfaces

    1. Vendors are under no obligation to provide "open" or "standard" interfaces, other than as described above for data access and monitoring. APIs for modifying user experience, frameworks for building extensions or even complete applications for the vendor platform, or such technologies can be developed however the vendor sees fit. If a vendor chooses to require developers to write applications in a custom programming language with esoteric data storage algorithms and heavily piracy protected execution systems, so be it.

      If it seems that this completely abdicates the customer's power in the business relationship, this is not so. As the "cloud" is a marketplace of technology infrastructures, platforms and applications, the customer exercises their power by choosing where to spend their hard earned money. A decision to select a platform vendor that locks you into proprietary Python libraries, for instance, is a choice to support such programming lock-in. On the other hand, insistence on portable virtual machine formats will drive the market towards a true commodity compute capacity model.

      The key reason for giving vendors such power is to maximize innovation. By restricting how technology gets developed or released, the market risks restricting the ways in which technologists can innovate. History shows that eventually the "open" market catches up to most innovations (or bypasses them altogether), and the pace at which this happens is greatly accelerated by open source. Nonetheless, forcing innovation through open source or any other single method runs the risk of weakening capitalist entrepreneurial risk taking.

    2. The customer, however, has the right to use any method legally possible to extend, replicate, leverage or better any given vendor technology. If a vendor provides a proprietary API for virtual machine management in their cloud, customers (aka "the community", in this case) have every right to experiment with "home grown" implementations of alternative technologies using that same API. This is also true for replicating cloud platform functionality, or even complete applications--though, again, the right only extends to legal means.

      Possibly the best thing a cloud vendor can do to extend their community, and encourage innovation on their platform from community members is to open their platform as much as possible. By making themselves the "reference platform" for their respective market space, an open vendor creates a petrie dish of sorts for cultivating differentiating features and successes on their platform. Protective proprietary vendors are on their own.

These three articles serve as the baseline for customer, vendor and, as necessary, government relationships in the new network-based computing marketplace. No claim is made that this document is complete, or final. These articles may be changed or extended at any time, and additional articles can be declared, whether in response to new technologies or business models, or simply to reflect the business reality of the marketplace. It is also a community document, and others are encouraged to bend and shape it in their own venues.

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